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In general, international attention has focused primarily on the economic and social crisis facing
Cuba today, as well as the economic reforms set in motion by the Cuban government to confront
the problems at hand. At the same time, however, profound political changes are also underway
on the island many of which are direct consequences of economic reform but very little attention
has been paid to these political developments. Following is the second part of an interview with
Dr. Nelson Valdes, LADB Project Director and a leading scholar on Cuban affairs. In the first part
of the interview which appeared in the Nov. 4, 1993 edition of the Chronicle Valdes discussed the
economic and social situation in Cuba. In this second part, Valdes discusses the political reforms
now underway in Cuba, while reviewing more changes in Cuba's political system that could
emerge in the near future. Valdes also discusses in depth the nature of present US- Cuba relations,
particularly examining the domestic conditions in the US that impede changes in US policy toward
Cuba, as well as the prospects for a positive evolution in the two countries' bilateral relations in
the future. The interview was conducted on Oct. 16, 1993 by LADB economic affairs editor Kevin
Robinson. KR: Up to this point, we've discussed some of the economic changes taking place in Cuba,
and the social consequences of the economic crisis that now grips the island. Let's talk now about
the political situation in Cuba. Is the government considering political reforms? If so, what are they,
and what are the incentives for such changes? NV: I think there are political changes coming, but
they are not necessarily the kind of political changes that people outside of Cuba are looking for.
Outsiders call for things like legalization of political parties, granting of freedom to organize and to
associate for political purposes, being able to speak openly in an organized fashion about politics,
etc. These kinds of changes, often referred to outside of Cuba as "democratization," are not likely
to occur, at least not in the short term. The changes occurring in Cuba are in fact profound, but
they are of a different nature. I mentioned some of them earlier. First, a redefinition of the role of
the state. The command economy, the state's control over the economic life of the country, that
is beginning to disappear. Cuba is moving away from a situation where the state is the primary
employer toward one where the state is just one more employer among many. It is increasingly
possible to become a political player without necessarily depending on the state. This changes
the way politics works in Cuba in a very fundamental way. Second, we now have a situation in
which the importance of the Communist Party is declining. The mass organizations are now acting
independently from the Communist Party. Although it has not yet occurred in practice, the mass
organizations have the potential to become powerful lobbies on behalf of the particular sector that
they represent. If that were to occur, I think you would have a much more pluralist society, with
many political actors, although without necessarily having a multi-party political system. Third,
there has been a de facto shift in the focus of power away from the central government and toward
the provincial and municipal governments. I think the really interesting political changes in Cuba
are to be found at those two levels rather than at the level of the national government. If there is to
be a multiplicity of views expressed and people taking positions and then defending those positions,
it is at those levels that you're going to find it. With the political reforms enacted in 1992, voters
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now directly elect their representatives to the municipal and provincial governments. Meanwhile,
with the new economic policies, each province is supposed to be self-sufficient in terms of food
production, with the exception of Havana. The same is true in the case of the municipalities: each
municipality must look after its own interests. The upshot of all this is that Cuba is becoming a much
more complex society, with many more actors and players. There are two possibilities: coalitionbuilding, or a "law of the jungle" type situation. What you are beginning to see is all kinds of give
and take negotiations between independent economic and political actors, and coalition building
activities, all taking place outside the realm of political parties. This is a reality that very few people
are paying attention to. KR: These changes are, in a sense, a byproduct of the general changes taking
place in Cuban society, as opposed to government-promoted policies. But political changes are
also being promoted deliberately from above, like in the case of the National Assembly elections
in late 1992. What is being sought with the reforms adopted in terms of the National Assembly?
Have there been any other changes in terms of electoral politics? NV: The National Assembly was
first established in fact as a provincial assembly in 1974. Between 1976 and last year, the National
Assembly was, for all intents and purposes, a fairly weak institution. The main problem with the
Assembly was the system of indirect elections. Candidates were elected at the municipal level,
and then they, in turn, decided among themselves who would go to the provincial level, and then
those at the provincial level would decide who would go on to the National Assembly. Under the
previous system, the National Assembly only met for one week, two times per year. What happened
during the other 54 weeks? An executive committee, appointed by the National Assembly, would
basically draft the legislation and would run things on a day-to-day basis. Under last year's reforms,
the executive committee system and the indirect elections were abolished. Now, voters directly
elect their representatives at the municipal, provincial and national levels. Also, under the previous
system, candidates could run in an election unopposed, and in all races the candidate receiving the
most votes was automatically the winner. Now, each candidate must win at least 50% of the valid
votes cast, otherwise successive rounds of voting are held until someone gets at least 50%. Perhaps
the most important change, however, is that the National Assembly is now taking up a series of
functions it didn't have before. There are indications that it will be the National Assembly which
will initiate, from this point on, all of the major economic changes that take place in Cuba. A special
economic commission has been formed within the National Assembly to decide what the next issues
in terms of economic reforms will be, as well as what type of legislation will regulate the economic
system. That commission is poised to play an important role in terms of defining the evolution of
the reform process. Meanwhile, the National Assembly is currently working on legislation regarding
freedom of the press and freedom of religion. They are also working on the creation of a legal
framework for non-governmental organizations (NGOs). And remember, this work is not being
done, as in the past, by a tiny executive committee, but now by the elected members of the National
Assembly itself. Under the previous system, the members of the powerful executive committee
didn't even have to be drawn from among the ranks of the National Assembly. Thus, non-elected
members could essentially run the National Assembly. That is no longer the case. I think these
changes are all part of a strategy to try and make the economic and political system in Cuba work,
independent of whether US policy toward the country changes. They have decided that, in the
final analysis, what must take precedence are internal, domestic solutions to the crisis, and these
reforms represent the effort to search for solutions to Cuba's problems, regardless of whether the
US embargo continues. It is important to note, however, that the debate taking place over reforms
is not a public one, it is not appearing on the pages of Cuban newspapers, or on TV or radio. It is
taking place as a discussion at different levels within the official institutions. Out in the streets,
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this kind of information is not circulating. Even within the party itself, there is no overall view as to
how all of these reforms fit together. KR: Do you see more political reforms on the horizon? Also,
do you think external pressures might eventually force the government to accept greater reforms?
NV: It's difficult to see what kind of changes may be in store. It's the kind of question that one may
need to answer on the basis of history. Overall, from 1959 to the present, the Cuban government's
approach has been guided by two principles. First, unity in the face of the foreign threat. Second, the
principle of coalition building, of taking different perspectives and somehow finding a way to make
them work together. That has been Fidel Castro's big contribution. There have been all kinds of
suggestions over the years that reflect these two principles. For example, during the last Communist
Party congress there was talk that the party would soon change its name from the Communist
Party of Cuba to the "Party of the Cuban Nation." It didn't come to pass, but what was implicit
in that approach was the creation of a popular front, an organization comprised of diverse forces.
My sense is that at this moment, that's the direction they are moving in. For instance, allowing
religious people to join the ranks of the Communist Party. I would assume that as more and more
people become alienated, more and more people go into exile, the government's approach will not
be to become more sectarian, but rather to become more inclusive. That may eventually include
attempts to approach the exile community. There are also indications that they would like to meet
some of the demands being made abroad. But they will only be met if there is a way to meet them
on Cuba's terms. If someone were to approach Cuba and say, for example, we want to come up
with "suggestions" as to how to deepen, extend, or enhance Cuban democracy, I think the Cubans
would be receptive. But if the approach is "We're going to go to Cuba to tell the Cubans what they
need to do," the Cubans see that as interference in the internal affairs of the country, regardless
of whether the intention behind such an initiative is good or bad. The Cubans have announced,
for example, that they intend to put together some kind of commission, including 15 or 20 Nobel
prize winners, to go to Cuba to look at a series of issues, including human rights, and then come out
with a report. They say they are willing to do this because they have nothing to hide, that Cuba will
come out looking much better than many countries. But on the other hand, they will not allow the
United Nations to send a rapporteur to Cuba. Why? Because the statement creating the rapporteur's
office begins by asserting that Cuba violates human rights. Why do they need to investigate if
they've already reached their conclusion? I mention this because it is suggestive that there may be
demands out there that the Cubans are willing to meet. But they will only meet them under certain
circumstances. Above all, meeting such demands cannot imply a violation of Cuban sovereignty.
What changes might occur in the future? The Cuban authorities have said they are willing to engage
in dialogue with people who show respect toward them. But I don't think the Cubans will accept
the idea promoted in the US and elsewhere that what the Cuban government ought to do is sit
down with the "opposition." The position of the Cuban government is that there is no organized
opposition. So when the US, or Argentina, or Spain, says, "Well, what you need to do is meet with
Elizardo Sanchez," the Cuban government's response is that these people are individual Cuban
citizens who do not represent any mass movement. Why meet with them and not with somebody
else? If they were the leaders of organized movements, then perhaps. Rather than accommodate
an unorganized "opposition," I think what we may see are more reforms inside the party, reforms
that would pave the way for the formation of factions representing different interests or sectors
within the Communist Party itself. I don't foresee at all, however, the government opening up the
system for alternative political parties. KR: So, if a multi-party system is not on the agenda, then
what kinds of changes in the party are possible that would allow greater political pluralism? NV: I
think significant changes may be coming, a series of political changes all aimed at assuring survival
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while preserving the essential social character of the revolution. There are all kinds of things that
the authorities could do which would make the articulation of multiple political perspectives
possible without changing the underlying character of the social and economic system. In terms
of the relative importance of the different changes, I would say the following. First, they need to
change the Communist Party statutes in order to allow for the establishment of organized caucuses
within the party. In addition, changes must be implemented in order to allow information internal
to the party to flow not only up and down, vertically, but also horizontally. The way the system is
structured now, a Communist Party base committee sends its information beginning at the district
level, and from there it goes to the municipality, then to the province, then to the national level.
The other base committees located in the same municipality may not know what their colleagues
across the street are saying! Consequently, you have a very alienated, or at least isolated, party
organization. Changes are needed which will allow for greater functional exchanges within the
party. That's something that would allow the party to have a much more active profile. In fact, I
would argue that one of the problems in Cuba is that even the Communist Party does not function
well as a party. It functions as an administrative instrument for the exercise of power, but not as
a party. There should be a democratization of the Communist Party. Once that occurs, then you
could truly strive for a party that represents all of society, an authentic democratic struggle could
occur within the ranks of the party, rather than outside of it. The point is that to get to this type of
situation doesn't require allowing more political parties. But it does require recognizing that we
are dealing with a complex society which has multiple perspectives. Second, it is essential for the
National Assembly to become a functional institution that works throughout the entire year. In
addition, I think the Assembly should have two houses. At present, Assembly members are elected
not on the basis of what they stand for, but on the basis of their own personal history. So and so
gets elected because he was a vanguard worker, he served in Angola, and so forth. One proposal
would be to set up a bicameral legislature. In the upper house, you would have the type of candidate
I mentioned above, nominated by the Communist Party. A different kind of candidate, nominated
for example by the mass organizations, would serve in the lower house. These candidates would
address a whole series of questions of how, when they get elected, they will address priorities,
process and methods, etc. It's the mass organizations which represent the different interests of the
Cuban people. Third is the issue of direct elections for the executive branch. Under the current
system, it is the elected members of the National Assembly who pick the executive. I think it would
be to everyone's benefit to have direct elections for the executive, and let's see what happens. That
would not require any major changes to the Cuban system. KR: On another level, there seems to be
a process of change, or renovation, taking place within the Cuban government and institutions, with
a much younger group of people now moving into leadership positions. NV: Clearly, a transition
is underway. Fidel provides the continuity, a kind of essential element that if he were not present,
who knows what would happen. Fidel has been the coalition builder, essential for assuring that
you don't have internal upheaval that could manifest itself in a violent fashion. But you now have a
situation where the people who are in charge of many government institutions are quite young. For
example, the new foreign minister, Roberto Robaina, is only 38 years old. You now see ambassadors
who are only 30 or 31 years old. The Cuban consul in Canada is just 24 years old. Three years ago,
people would say, "Oh, the problem is Fidel and his whole entourage of very conservative old men."
Well, in the recent National Assembly elections, most of the old timers were thrown out. All of this,
however, is not a matter of the young pushing aside aging leaders, but rather a reflection of the
effort to institutionalize the revolution. The Cuban leadership has studied history very carefully.
I assure you, they have learned certain things from history, certain basic things, about how to
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institutionalize a revolutionary process. Among others, they have carefully studied the Mexican
experience. KR: Looking beyond Fidel, what are some of the basic goals of the new up-and-coming
leaders in Cuba? NV: Well, once you get past all those issues which are bound up with the notion
that "Cuba will never be the same without Fidel," I would say that what they are simply striving
for is the possibility of assuring Cuba's survival as a "normal" country. In the Cuban context, a
"normal" country would be one where Cuban national sovereignty is respected. Can Cuba become a
nation-state whose sovereignty is not questioned on a day to day basis? Nobody questions whether
France should have the social, economic and political system it has. Why Cuba? It would also be
a country where the experience of this dramatic social revolution, with its element of nationalism,
is preserved, where certain social rights are acknowledged. Those are the basic pillars that are not
to be questioned under any circumstances. Pretty much everything else, however, is subject to
definition. What will the political arrangements be, what is the economic mix, etc. Still, it is clear
that whatever emerges, it will neither be pre-1959, nor will it be the same as what existed between
1959 and 1992. It will be something else, something new. KR: Let's talk now about US policy toward
Cuba. To what extent is US policy having an impact on the changes currently going on in Cuba?
NV: Historically, the US has exercised its power in Cuba in two ways: "proactive" and veto power.
Since the beginning of this century, proactive US policy toward Cuba has meant essentially that
the US has all the answers and it will impose upon Cuba its legal framework, its political goals
and its values. Of course, in reality, you cannot impose on another society what it took your own
society centuries to get. I think some people tend to forget this, but it is certainly a large part of the
problem. Take the example of Weimar Germany. In World War I, Germany was defeated, then the
allies went in and imposed a new constitution, the Weimar Constitution. What happened? Hitler
got elected. Why? Because the political culture necessary to fulfill that constitution did not exist, the
social forces were not there. In this sense, what the US did in the past, historically, was to impose
on Cuba a constitution, impose a certain form of government, a certain economic system, and it
never worked. This is why there was a revolution in the first place. The other approach the US has
had is veto power. This means that when the US has tried to impose a certain scheme, and social
reality in Cuba does not allow it to work, and then Cuba attempts to continue in its own direction,
then veto power comes in and the US simply says, "We won't allow it." So in both cases, proactive
and veto power, the end result is a balance of failure. The tragic bilateral history of Cuba and the
US boils down to a balance of failure. Cuban nationalism can always be vetoed by the US. Cuba is
simply not strong enough to override that veto. On the other hand, the US is not strong enough to
create the kind of Cuba envisioned by the US. Cuban reality will always wind up defeating the US
ideals. It seems extraordinary, but I believe the only way that the US could really absorb or coopt
Cuban nationalism is by giving it a hand. As a power in the region, the US has been around a lot
longer than Cuba. Remember, as a real independent nation, Cuba is only 34 years old. Cuba was
not independent before 1959. US independence goes back to 1776, over 200 years. So just on the
basis of experience and old age, the US as the "elder" should lend a hand to this young 34 year-old
nation state which we call Cuba. KR: Indeed, after 34 years, it would seem that if the US wants to
achieve some of its goals in Cuba, then US policy toward the island needs to be more constructive.
Under the Clinton administration, is a new policy emerging? NV: The Clinton administration is
following a policy which was basically put in place during the Reagan years, when a dramatic US
policy shift toward Cuba occurred. Prior to 1981, US policy was based on whether Cuba met a series
of preconditions for normal relations. Before 1981, those preconditions were defined in terms of
Cuba's relations with the rest of the world. In other words, the US would say "We need to be paid
compensation for the property you nationalized from us," or "You need to take your troops out of
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Angola," or "You need to break your relations with the Soviets." At no point was there a situation
where the US was saying, "The only way we'll improve relations with Cuba is if the economic, social
and political system that Cuba now has comes to an end." Not even under the most conservative
administrations like Eisenhower or Nixon did the US demand that the Cubans make internal
changes in order to move toward normalization of bilateral relations. But when Reagan came in,
he forced a shift in the arguments underlying policy toward Cuba, whereby the normalization of
relations would from there forward be contingent upon fundamental internal changes on the island.
Still, Reagan carried out his policies in the form of executive orders, not legislation. Now with the
"Torricelli Bill," or the Cuban Democracy Act signed into law by Bush last year this same framework
of interference in the internal affairs of Cuba has been transformed into a bipartisan, legally-binding
policy. What had been limited to the prerogative of the executive in the case of Reagan and later
Bush has now become the legal framework under which any future US president will have to work.
Stated simply, the domestic social, political and economic makeup of Cuba has to be acceptable
to the US before there can be any normalization of relations. In a sense, the signing into law of the
Torricelli Bill denied Clinton any possibility of defining a new initiative toward Cuba because he
has to work within the confines of the existing laws. So, even if Clinton were committed to changing
policy toward Cuba, he would have to first change the law. Otherwise, the most he could possibly
do is push for an improvement in relations through the back door, through administrative fiat.
For example, by simply not exercising the power that the law compels him to exercise. If the law
says, Americans cannot travel to Cuba, but Americans travel to Cuba, it is then up to the Treasury
department to decide whether or not to prosecute. But there is not a whole lot of room for significant
change at this level. Clinton is thus in a very difficult and unique position, because even though
foreign policy is supposed to be the domain of the president, you now have on paper something that
legally binds the president in terms of what he can do on policy toward Cuba. KR: So, the Torricelli
Bill basically signified the institutionalization of policies begun under Reagan, in effect placing
a straightjacket on the new administration. It also apparently established bipartisan approval of
those policies. Nevertheless, are there cracks within US foreign policy-making circles over what
to do with Cuba policy? Are there alternative proposals emerging that might challenge the legal
straightjacket? NV: Almost every major analyst of Cuba recognizes that US policy toward Cuba
isn't working. Furthermore, they recognize that even if it were to "work," the most likely outcome
would be civil war in Cuba and a massive outpouring of refugees to the US. You can find people
at the State department, at the National Security Council (NSC), who aren't really comfortable
with the current policy. To name just two, Anthony Lake and Richard Feinberg, both at the NSC.
The problem is that policy toward Cuba is not determined by the professionals at State or even at
the NSC. Nor is it determined on the basis of what actually happens in Cuba. Policy toward Cuba
is determined on the basis of a four-year cycle of US presidential elections and a two year cycle
of US congressional elections. Cuba policy is essentially a hostage of US electoral politics. As the
old saying goes, "Will it play in Peoria?," with Cuba policy, everything revolves around "Will it
play in Tallahassee? Will it play in Miami?" Why Miami? Because of electoral votes. Florida has a
major significance in terms of electoral votes. This is a situation which goes far beyond the fact that
the Cuban American National Foundation [CANF headed by Jorge Mas Canosa] provided funds
to the Clinton campaign, or other such things. The bottom line is that there are too many vested
interests which stand to gain by seeing the policy continue as it is. Outside of the Cuban government
disappearing altogether, it makes no difference what Cuba does. Change by the Cubans will not
have a significant effect on US policy for the simple reason that it is not Cuba's behavior which
determines US policy toward Cuba, it is a series of factors internal to the US. Until that situation
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changes the policy cannot possibly change. Keep in mind that there are important economic
interests involved here. Is it in the interests of the state of Florida to have a "free Cuba" which would
be competing for tourist dollars? Is it in the interests of the Miami area real estate market to have a
situation where you might be able to buy beach front homes around Havana at bargain basement
prices? I doubt it. What would happen to real estate values in south Florida, what would happen
to gambling in New Jersey, if Cuba opens up? What would the Drug Enforcement Administration
do if Cuba became an "open country"? Will they have more or less work than they do now? If the
"Cuban threat" were to disappear, what would happen to the budget of the Central Intelligence
Agency or the Pentagon? What would happen to sugar exports from the Dominican Republic? I
think there are just too many vested interests that are perhaps better off without the policy truly
succeeding in overthrowing Fidel and without any significant improvement in bilateral relations.
The impasse serves them well. It is better for Cuba to limp on into the 21st century much as it is
now. One thing that might indeed compel the US to change its policy is the prospect that the Cuban
policy of opening up to foreign investments gains a critical mass at which point American capital
is going to have to consider whether this is a wise policy. After all, when Cuba "depenalized" the
dollar it met one of the conditions that the IMF often puts forward. Moreover, the 100% repatriation
of profits permitted by Cuba for foreign investors is even a better deal than what Yeltsin offers. All
this might create a situation in which a new configuration of forces emerges within US society. There
have already been some indications that things could move in this direction. For example, the New
York Times, the Washington Post, the Boston Globe, the Los Angeles Times, and the San Francisco
Examiner have all come out with editorials against the embargo. KR: What would need to happen
in order for there to be a change in US policy? NV: First, the White House would have to come to
grips with the reality that within the Cuban American community, the conservative perspective
is not the only one. Just as US conservatives helped the CANF become what it is today, the White
House and other executive agencies would have to assist in the creation of a Liberal, perhaps slightly
nationalist, Cuban American organization that would be supportive of such a shift in policy. Then,
the Cuban government would have to recognize that organization as a legitimate interlocutor,
or entity with which it could engage in discussions. The key would be to establish a linkage that
could allow a process of give and take on both sides. Now, what would this linkage look like? We
are talking about a series of quid pro quos. For example, the Cuban government could begin by
saying something like, "We have people in prison that we will free, no conditions attached. They
attempted to overthrow the government, they were caught and sentenced, but now we are releasing
them." In other words, the Cubans would have to send a signal that is considered in some sense
significant. The US government could then reciprocate by saying, "We will support the concept of
humanitarian aid to Cuba. We ask the Cuban American people and the American people to provide
that aid, and it will be tax deductible." This is nothing new, mind you. This was done in 1962 after
Cuba announced that the Bay of Pigs invaders were to be released. In turn, the US agreed to send
US$68 million worth of baby food to Cuba. Something like that would be the first step. Next, the
Cuban government could declare a major reduction in the size of its armed forces. And the US could
reciprocate by lifting the ban on selling food and medicine to Cuba. Or, the US could, perhaps,
announce that it would issue every year the 20,000 visas that it has agreed to give Cubans, but which
are currently not given. The two countries could negotiate a coastal agreement in order to make sure
that Cubans don't take to the sea to escape Cuba. I think that if the US were to actually grant those
20,000 visas, Cuba would have greater security and they might consider lifting criminal penalties
against attempts to leave the country. Likewise, I think both countries could work on some kind of
arrangement for the establishment of a special fund for the compensation of US property owners.
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For example, Cuba could contribute to a special fund under which so much sugar and so much
citrus fruits are exported free of charge to the US where they are then sold. All the proceeds from
the sale would go into the compensation fund. The concept of linkage essentially means that the
two countries set a ranking of priorities and then they sit down and try to match the rankings. For
example, let's suppose that it is really a major concern of the US that Cuba should have a freer
press. The US could create a fund for the development of journalism in Cuba, but which would
also allow Cuba to purchase the paper that it does not have now in order to normalize publishing
of Granma, [the official daily]. A percentage of what is published would have to consist of opinions
different from the official line. I think both sides should collaborate on a mechanism of conflict
resolution to teach Cubans here as well as in Cuba. KR: To what extent can these scenarios you are
describing realistically emerge under the Clinton administration? To what extent are there cracks,
or divisions, in the structure of the Cuban exile community that would allow such a normalization of
relations to take place? NV: The Cuban exile community has always been a very diverse community,
politically speaking. Before the 1980s, there were numerous political organizations, over 200 political
organizations ranging from anarchists and social democrats to conservatives, and even groups
of "Fidelistas." The exile community is a very interesting and diverse community. It is politically
conservative when it comes to Cuba. But it is not a conservative community when it comes to
social values. The CANF was born in 1981 with Ronald Reagan's ascension to power. The CANF is
actually a very strange organization, almost an anomaly, within the Cuban American community.
For example, you won't find too many Cuban Americans who actually identify with the free market
perspective advocated by the CANF. The CANF is a creation of the New Right, the Moral Majority,
the Reagan revolution and all that. They opened the door to the White House and pulled Jorge Mas
Canosa through it. It's not that he had enough power to muscle his way into the White House, they
built him up, they groomed him. In that sense, what the Clinton administration would have to do
now is to open doors on the left wing of the White House and pull some Cuban Americans from
that part of the community into the White House. I think if US policy-makers look at Cuba carefully,
the conclusion they are bound to reach is that the US has got to change its policy. Still, there are
many political costs in changing the policy as I already mentioned, and very few benefits in the short
term. Although a change in policy toward Cuba may be the rational thing to do, it is clearly not the
political thing to do, at least not as long as the conservatives within the Cuban American community
are allowed to monopolize the terms of the debate. As I said before, the US could facilitate and
foment such a change. But my personal view on this matter is that perhaps it ought not to fall to the
US government to do this, for historical and for political reasons. Perhaps it should be the Cuban
government. In other words, what if the Cuban government were to recognize, as a matter quite
apart from the status of US-Cuba bilateral relations, that there is a Cuban community out there
that is in a sense part of Cuba? They know that within that community are some very conservative
people who want to destroy the revolution and everything it stands for. But they also know that
not all Cuban Americans are like that. The Cuban government could decide to initiate talks with
those sectors, and there could be room for them to accommodate some moderate demands from
those sectors. The Cuban government could, in fact, help them become more influential within the
exile community. In essence, they could adopt a conscious, self-proclaimed policy of recognizing
a part of the exile community as their interlocutors. I think if the Cuban authorities were to do
that, then Clinton would eventually be confronted with a new reality, and he could be forced to
respond accordingly. If nothing else, at least he would then have to contend with two perspectives as
they develop and counter one another in Miami and elsewhere, unlike the current situation where
the CANF is allowed to monopolize the show. KR: In fact, there are indications that the Cuban
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government is already making such overtures to the Cuban exile community, no? NV: Yes, there
are some indications, but it remains to be seen what that means. For example, one possibility is that
they do not look for a political counterpart, that they instead just look for a series of voices, from
different communities, individuals that raise issues regarding the needs and interests of the Cuban
American community in terms of going to Cuba, traveling, food, for humanitarian reasons, family
reunification, you name it. They may very well wish to normalize relations between the Cuban state
and immigrants and leave it at that, receive the economic payoffs of normalization without going
the next step and paying the political costs of finding an interlocutor that could not only have an
impact in Washington, but that could very well claim the right to project influence within Cuba
as well. Again, if they were to go for this limited route, then they may not be able to utilize that
community to help change US policy. The problem that Cuba confronts is that if they want to get rid
of the embargo, the US will certainly require a political front behind which to do it, and that front
will have to come from among the ranks of the Cuban American community. Cuba could do that,
but it would have to pay a price. They would obtain the benefits from the lifting of the embargo, but
they would have to pay the price in terms of that community attempting to define, in some fashion,
what happens inside Cuba. KR: In closing, what are some of the possible scenarios that you see for
the future in terms of US-Cuba relations? NV: First, you could have what we have had for 34 years,
some marginal changes, but at a deeper level, nothing really changes, a prolongation of the impasse
as we talked about earlier. If we go by what history tells us, this is perhaps the most likely scenario.
Second, US policy could continue more or less as is, but rather than political stability on the island,
at some point you begin to see, for whatever reasons, organized dissent, perhaps in the form of civil
disobedience at first, and then organized opposition, armed opposition. After all, there was such
activity in Cuba in the early 1960s, perhaps it could happen again. In this second scenario, if US
policy remained essentially the same, then the question is, what will the Cuban exile community
do? I think the Cuban exile community would move quickly to take advantage of the situation, and
then things could get very nasty inside Cuba. Still, the Cuban government probably could bring the
situation under control. It's very hard to imagine what the US government would do under those
circumstances. Now, if you had upheaval and the US decided to get involved, for humanitarian
reasons or under whatever pretext, in that case you would wind up with a civil war that ultimately,
neither the Cuban government nor the US would be able to control. If the US were to intervene,
then we would see upheaval in Cuba for many years to come. Nationalism would fire Cuban politics
for a long time. Another possibility would be that the US does not change its policy and over the
next four to five years the economy bottoms out and begins to improve. This would represent a fairly
serious problem for the US, in terms of the ability of a Third World country to chart an independent
course, stick to it, and, despite massive opposition from the US, eventually succeed. In a sense,
that's the last thing Washington would like to see happen. A final scenario, as I mentioned before,
would be for the US to slowly engage Cuba. If engagement were to occur now, then when the Cuban
economy eventually begins to improve, the Cubans would have no choice but to acknowledge that
perhaps the US had something to do with it. In that case, Cuba would no longer be viable in terms
of an alternative, nationalist model for the Third World. The idea would be that Cuba was a "failure"
until the US got involved. In all these scenarios, I can't see a situation often talked about in the US
in which Fidel dies or gets killed and that leads to some kind of peaceful transfer of power into the
hands of the exiles. I honestly cannot foresee any situation in which the exiles would be invited to
Cuba to take over, that's just completely unrealistic. In any case, if Fidel Castro was assassinated,
I think Cuban politics would be shaped in the same fashion as in Argentina after Peron. For years,
perhaps decades, to come, people would refer to the 1960's and 1970's as the "good old days" when
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Fidel was in power, and "Why don't we attempt to do that again," that sort of thing. Which of these
scenarios is the most likely? I would say a lingering of the present situation for a long time, until the
Cubans slowly begin pulling out of the crisis. That's my sense.

-- End --
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